Kiaora grantrobertson1 I listened to your speech in the HOUSE 8/8/2013

PART ONE grossly expanded the POWERS OF THE GCSB without adequate oversight mechanisms and in a way that many New Zealander's are uncomfortable with.

What PART TWO does is make some changes and improvements to the ‘oversight’ of the GCSB and for that we are grateful.

If we look at the NEW 629, the new clause 5.We say straight away where some of the problem starts.

5 (2) The Inspector-General and deputy Inspector-General must be appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister following consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Once again, we want to recap where we have the Prime Minister and the different roles that the Prime Minister has in relation to the GCSB.


We have the Prime Minister appointing the Director of the GCSB and we’ve already seen with the appointment of IAN FLETCHER how the Prime Minister’s role in that process can be abused, when the Prime Minister cuts across a process that’s already in place. Calls his friend up, tells his friend to speak to the Chief Executive from the Prime Minister’s Department who is on the appointment panel and ONLY ONE PERSON GETS INTERVIEWED FOR THAT ROLE and that is the Prime Minister’s friend [IAN FLETCHER], and then that person gets appointed.

[interruption by Annette King Labour MP]

Grant Robertson: Yes, that’s right the HEAD of the PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT, as Annette King reminds me, met with that person [Fletcher], while the process was underway. So, that’s our concern about that.

The Prime Minister appointing the Head of the GCSB. The Prime Minister is chairing the Oversight Committee for the GCSB and here now, this clause here, we have the Prime Minister Responsible for ensuring, for appointing the Inspector-General and the deputy Inspector-General.

What we’re saying on this side of the HOUSE, Mr. CHAIR, is that we look at the way in which the Inspector-General’s function is setup and we need to move with the times.

This legislation was created in 1996, and we fast-forward to 2013.

People’s concerns about the role of security and intelligence agencies, the kind of information that’s being collected, means that this WATCHDOG ROLE that we’re talking about in PART TWO, is more important than ever. And we actually do have to recognise that things are different then they were in 1996.

The public have a higher expectation of the kind of ‘oversight’ ‘watchdog’ role that will be in place.

Now Mr Robertson, this is the part of your speech that pushed my memory rewind button.

And what I want to mention and suggest Mr. CHAIR is what should be here in this PART, is the ROLE of PARLIAMENT in this, the role of parliament Now we do have some change to that. That a member of parliament can under the new section or the amended section 11, can initiate inquiry, but the whole process of the appointment of the Inspector-General is actually one that I would venture to suggest, should end up being an Officer of Parliament, time-role in the long-term.

It would be the kind of issue that would be raised in the ‘Review’ that the Labour Party has been proposing but my personal view is, we should be moving that role towards an Officer of Parliament position and I think that’s an important step we could take to restore confidence in this role of Inspector-General. That’s not what’s here. So we have some improvements here in clause 5, to create a deputy-Inspector-General role. But we, on this side of the HOUSE, believe that this role, Inspector-General should be considered for being a role for an Officer of Parliament.

We know from the role from the other Offices of Parliament play, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, the Auditor-General, Ombudsman, that those roles are one-step removed from the day-to-day process of government and that is what will restore confidence in the GCSB and the Inspector-General’s role if New Zealander's know that person is effectively working on behalf of parliamentarians who work on behalf of them. So that is the direction the Labour Party would like to see considered and unfortunately this section does not go that far. And while we would like to support all of these changes that are in this Bill, in the end when a Bill does not give the ‘oversight’ and the ‘watchdog’ role, the power we believe it has then we will not be able to support that aspect of the Bill.

I read an article by Elizabeth McLeay, titled 'Scrutiny and Capacity: An evaluation
of the parliamentary committees in the New Zealand Parliament', sometime ago and I am of the opinion that it was written especially for you.

Here's the PDF Link: http://aspg.org.au/journal/2006autumn_21_1/5-0%20McLeayApril.2006rev2.pdf 

I have learnt so much about Parliamentary process but there is so much more to learn and as time never stands still, so must our political processes as you so eloquently put it, "we need to move with the times".

But for me, I need to venture back into the past, so that I can see the position I am in today and it's quite a fascinating meandering experience.

I thoroughly enjoyed listening to your oration via Parliamentary youtube and admittedly you are the first and only MP that never bored me.

Thank you.

Article 2: HANSARD - 13 March 1862 NEW ZEALAND.—QUESTION. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

HANSARD 1803–2005 → 1860s → 1862 → March 1862 → 13 March 1862 → Commons Sitting → SUPPLY—POSTPONED RESOLUTION (BARRACKS AT HOME AND ABROAD) —SANDHURST COLLEGE.

NEW ZEALAND.—QUESTION.

HC Deb 13 March 1862 vol 165 cc1441-9

MR. ADDERLEY said, he rose to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, What is the nature of the new plan of Native Administration proposed by the Governor of New Zealand; and whether the Imperial Government will be free from responsibility for the scheme, and from the Military and Civil Expenditure involved in its adoption; and, also, whether the present number of Troops in that Colony is about to be reduced? He had given notice of the question, as that was the last opportunity the House would have during the present Session of considering the whole subject of the military expenditure going on in New Zealand; and that time next year would be too late for any consideration whatsoever of that important question. He wished to have a full state meat from Her Majesty's Government of what was being done in that colony There were 7,000 troops, besides the naval equipment, maintained for local purposes entirely at the cost of this country. In the town of Auckland the British troops formed a considerable portion of the entire population. By a Resolution which the House had adopted a few nights previously, it was decided that for the future the colonies of the country should he responsible for the maintenance of order within their own boundaries. No doubt, in assenting to that Resolution, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies attempted to make an exception in favour of those colonies in which the colonists had to deal with native tribes, and New Zealand was so circumstanced; but the hon. Gentleman held out a prospect that immediate steps would be taken to remove the exception by those colonies having full and unrestricted powers given to their own legislatures to deal with all their own affairs. He wished to know from the hon. Gentleman whether, in inaugurating a new native policy in New Zealand, the Government was taking measures to give effect to that principle? If the Government found themselves in any way impeded by the Act which created the Constitution, he should then desire to know in what manner the Act operated as an impediment, and whether the clause or clauses having that, effect could not be repealed. It was essential, he thought, for the interests of the colonists, and of the natives, that the new policy should be left to the responsibility of the colonial administration, and that a term should be placed to the wasteful and bloody system of interference which had hitherto prevailed. The Governor of New Zealand had designed a constitution for the natives, which was now in the hands of the Government. His plan was to map out the territory of the natives into circuits, then to cut them up into village districts. He proposed then to give each village district a native council, to be presided over by the chief, in the presence of the civil commissioner. The circuits were to have councils composed of the heads of the district councils, and the Chief Civil Commissioner was to preside. Sir George Grey proposed to maintain the right of the Crown to the waste lands, and to establish a new system of colonization by Crown grants upon conditions of occupancy and residence. The scheme was more creditable to the ingenuity of Sir George Grey than promising for the peace of the colony. It was also very doubtful whether, if adopted, it would lead to any diminution of the great expenditure of this country in New Zealand. It was difficult to discover from the Estimates the total expenditure in respect of any of the colonies, as the items were scattered here and there. But an approximate estimate might be made by taking the number of troops at present in the colony. The number was 7,000, and at £100 a man, which was the average expenditure, that  would be £700,000. But he was informed, in a letter from a leading public man in the colony, that the total cost of the colony to this country was £960,000 a year, added to which there was the cost of transport of troops, stores, and naval establishments, which made a total demand upon the mother country, from New Zealand alone, according to this gentleman's calculation, of at least a million and a half per annum. That expense, it should be remembered, was the cost incurred in respect of the colony by this country, and was exclusive of the losses arising from the war, which fell upon the colonists, and which could not be less than half a million per annum. The scheme of Sir George Grey would not lessen the burden now borne by this country unless it was provided to transfer the whole legislation and responsibility to the colony, and there did not appear to be any intention or hope of doing that. The plan of mapping out native lands would be a fertile cause of wars, and the local advisers of the Governor had pointed that out to him, as well as the probability that the local councils would be in frequent collision with the Government. But the presence of the Crown Commissioners implicated the Government in all the native legislation, and instituted a double government, which the colony for itself repudiated, saying, "If you do this, it must be your own act, as representing the English Government." Sir George replied that the English Government would be well satisfied if they escaped paying tens of thousands on war, to spend a few thousands a year in civilizing the natives. Even if Sir George Grey held out any hope of decreasing the military expenditure to be borne by the mother country, he still intended for us another expenditure for civilizing the natives, the success of which scheme was very doubtful. Already in New Zealand had Sir George Grey tried his civilization scheme, and had settled military pensioners there; but nothing had been heard of them during the recent war. Again, at the Cape Sir George Grey had induced this country, not only to maintain a complete army, but also to make large Votes for civil expenditure under the idea of civilizing the natives. No one had heard of any successful result from that expenditure, which had been reduced of late by Parliament, and which ought now to cease. He believed that Sir George Grey did not at all contemplate saving any expense to the Imperial Government by this scheme of his. It was stated before the colonial defences committee that negotiations had been going on between the Imperial Government and the Government of New Zealand for six years, to induce the Colonial Government to take on themselves some small share of the expenditure, and the result was, that the Government of New Zealand consented to pay to the Imperial Treasury £5 a head for all the Imperial troops in the colony, leaving the taxpayers of this country to pay the remaining £95. But bad as that offer was, even it had not been carried out, and the whole expense of the troops in the colony was paid out of the Imperial Treasury. And the colonists did not even thank us for what we had done. They said, that as the Imperial Government kept in their own hands the government of the Maories, they would not contribute to the support of Maori wars; but that if left to themselves, they would soon find the means of putting a stop to these wars. After all our expenditure on the score of philanthropy and of liberality to the colonists, we found it said in the leading articles of their papers, and the speeches of their leading men, that they did not consider the late war to be either politic or just, and that whenever the subject was discussed here we exhibited perfect ignorance of the origin and merits of the war. When such were the criticisms passed in the colony, he asked the Government whether they would not take that opportunity of putting an end to the existing system. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies would tell him that the correspondence between the colony and his department on the subject was yet incomplete. [Mr. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE: Hear, hear!] If that were so, the answer was most unsatisfactory; for if the Government were corresponding at all on the details of the plan, if they took any part in this matter, there was an end of the last chance of checking this interminable, bloody, and wasteful policy. He had hoped that the only answer of the Government in reference to the plan proposed would have been, "This is your affair; we have nothing to do with it. We cannot even advise you." But if a correspondence was to go on, he should take an early opportunity of asking the sense of the House upon the subject.

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE said, that his right hon. Friend was quite correct in supposing that on a former occasion he had, when replying to the Motion of the hon. Member for Taunton, drawn what seemed to be the plain and inevitable distinction between the expenses of maintaining internal order—internal police—within colonies of British origin, and the expenses entailed by the defence of British colonies against formidable native tribes residing within their borders or upon their frontiers. That seemed to him to be so obvious a distinction that he should have thought the right hon. Gentleman must have felt that the principle which ought to be applied to the one was in the very nature of things inapplicable to the other. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken as if there were something new, extraordinary, and monstrous, in the maintenance by this country of a certain body of troops in New Zealand for the purpose of protecting the colonists against, the real and pressing danger by which they were threatened. He would, however, remind the right hon. Gentleman that, whether rightly or wrongly, it was the system which this country had pursued for many generations, and under which New Zealand and other colonies had sprung into existence. The House must not forget that New Zealand was an infant colony, which sprang into existence twenty years ago under the protection of this country, and up to about fourteen or fifteen years ago had obtained an annual Parliamentary Vote towards its ordinary civil expenditure, but which, like other colonies, was now being called upon to contribute towards the maintenance of a military force. With the knowledge which he was bound to possess on this subject, he must say he was startled to hear from the right hon. Gentleman that the colonies of New Zealand not only did not ask the protection of this country, but had denounced the presence of our troops there as an insult and a burden, when the fact was that before the late troubles broke out they had bitterly complained of the garrison having been for several years cut down to a single regiment. The right hon. Gentleman, in support of his view, had quoted the opinions of New Zealand papers and of various gentlemen who, living in the southern island distant from the seat of war, were not personally interested in the protection of life and property from native dangers, but sat upon their seats with as much security as the right hon. Gentleman himself, and who—if any interest were to be imputed to any one in the matter—were interested in the continuance of the existing state of things in the northern islands, because otherwise the stream of emigration might he diverted from the south to the north. He (Mr. C. Fortescue) would ask whether the opinions of those persons were to be placed in competition with the opinions of the New Zealand Ministers for the last two years, and the great majority of the New Zealand Assembly, who had given their cordial and hearty support to the policy lately adopted by the Governor. It was a mis-statement of the case on the part of the right hon. Gentleman to say that the expensive and melancholy war in New Zealand had been deliberately promoted by the Government. There could be no doubt that the Governor, acting nominally as the representative of the Crown, but really acting in conjunction with his Ministers, did take certain steps against a very talented and active chief, which, contrary to the expectations and opinions of those who advised him, had led to these unfortunate hostilities. The right hon. Gentleman now threatened the Government with very serious consequences if they made themselves responsible for a plan of native administration, which he had been informed had been drawn up by Sir George Grey (the Governor) and his advisers, and which, he supposed, would involve this country in greatly-increased expense. That plan had only been received by his noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies a few days before the last mail left for New Zealand; but he might state that its object, so far from being what had been supposed by the right hon. Gentleman, was to diminish the risk of future native wars, to offer to the willing acceptance of the natives a system of local self-government, to be worked out mainly by themselves, and in districts not arbitrarily formed, but depending on the tribal divisions of the natives, so as to satisfy that craving for law and order which was one great cause of the King movement. The financial portion of the plan, however, was so incomplete that the noble Duke the Colonial Secretary had addressed a rigid inquiry to Sir George Grey as to the amount of effort and exertion and the extent of pecuniary contribution which New Zealand would be prepared to offer in order to carry out what appeared to be a large and costly system of native administration, and also what the colony was prepared to do towards repaying some of the expenses incurred in the late war. Her Majesty's Government had not committed themselves to any responsibility for any portion of Sir George Grey's plan, or the civil and military expenditure it might entail. They had simply limited themselves to making requisitions for fuller explanations, which they had a right to expect to enable them to judge of the working of the plan. One part of the plan he (Mr. Fortescue) approved, and it was an essential part of it—that the anomalous system under which the responsible Government in New Zealand had been debarred from the management of native affairs should be put an end to. The Governor had transferred these duties to a responsible department, and he was now acting in regard to the native affairs as in regard to other affairs of the colony. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to have been informed by some members of the Ministry of Sir George Grey that they entertained grave objections to the plan. But the plan had been drawn up, he believed, with the approval of the Governor's responsible Ministers; and it was most inconvenient that any member of that Ministry should instruct the right hon. Gentleman to inform the House of Commons that the plan in question had been condemned and objected to by Sir George Grey's Ministry. The information of the Government was quite different from that placed at the command of the right hon. Gentleman, and was, he trusted, more correct. The right hon. Gentleman wanted to know whether the number of troops at present in New Zealand would be reduced. Until the late unfortunate troubles the garrison of New Zealand consisted only of a single regiment, and he trusted that the policy adopted by Sir George Grey would tend to conciliate the native race, and would supply them with that system of law and order which had long been wanting, and which they had endeavoured to supply to themselves, so that they might revert to a small garrison again. He could not, however, conceive a more short-sighted policy than that which would withdraw the troops prematurely from New Zealand. At that crisis of the relations between the colonists and the native race, when the Government was disposed to make every concession to that race consistent with their own good, it was absolutely necessary that the natives should understand that it was through regard to their welfare, and not through fear of their arms, that Her Majesty's Government were introducing the proposed system. He earnestly hoped that the time would come before long when the troops might be withdrawn, but he hoped the House would support Her Majesty's Government in keeping them there at present.

MR. ROEBUCK said, that as time came round they were able to draw conclusions with respect to their past policy which would be useful for the future. He had the honour of a seat in that House when the colonization of New Zealand took place, and he recollected that the question of the aborigines then came under discussion. He startled the House and the Prime Minister of the day (Sir Robert Peel)—who, it was said, had the faculty of assimilating other men's ideas—by saying that experience had shown that wherever the white man put down his foot by the side of the brown man the brown man disappeared. They might put off the moment, but the time would come when the brown man would be extinguished, and the sooner that consummation took place the better. All they did by their pretended humanity was to extend the time in which he lingered in his misery. We began our colonies always by an injustice. What right had we in New Zealand? We put our foot there, we took the land from the natives, and then with a sort of sanctimonious hypocrisy we turned round and said, "We know that we do you an injury, but we will do you the least possible injury." But there were certain persons, missionaries and others, who said, "We will preach the Gospel to those people; we will make them Christians; we will do all except do them justice. If we went away and allowed them to govern themselves and inhabit their own country without interfering with them, we should do them justice, but that we do not intend to do." They might depend upon it, their mode of life, their habits, their thoughts, their European civilization were destruction to the brown man. They signed his death-warrant when they put their foot upon the shore of New Zealand, and therefore they could not pretend to save him from the inevitable destruction which was coming upon him. And now came the right hon. Gentleman and said, "Oh, withdraw your troops; it is a great expense." Why, that expense was the very result of their mock  humanity, their hypocrisy. Let the colonists be left to themselves, let them not be troubled with our ideas of justice, and they would settle the matter very quickly. For, what would they do? They would take possession openly and avowedly of the whole colony, and would say to the aborigines, "You must get away, and, if not, we will punish you." But, instead of leaving the colonists alone, they were attempting to set up a separate system of government from that of the colony; but then it had turned out a failure; it could not continue, and now they were about doing what twenty years ago he had advised them to do. Let there he no pretence, no hypocrisy. They were going to create a new country, a new people, to plant European civilization in the southern hemisphere. By so doing they would utterly destroy the aboriginal population, The people of England would find that the plainest policy was the best. They began with an injustice—they must take the consequence of their evil deed, the evil deed of going to New Zealand at all, which was to destroy the aboriginal race. His words would be called "horrible," "cruel." Cruel they might be, but they were the result of the past policy of the country. They had planted England in New Zealand; the Englishman would destroy the Maori, and the sooner the Maori was destroyed the better.

 
Marauders, rapists, thieves and murders - The EVIL ENGLISH

Ia ratou, nga PAAHEA, he pokokohua, nga tangata paruparu, nga tangata tahae, nga tangata tinihanga, nga tangata i te mahi kino, i te mahi KOHURU!

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1862/mar/13/new-zealand-question#S3V0165P0_18620313_HOC_22

Colonial administration in New Zealand 19th century

Kiaora kia koutou katoa.

I would like to share my research on the colonial administration of my whenua, Ko Aotearoa (Land of the Long White Cloud), also known as New Zealand.

Over a few weeks I shall blog historical information taken from UK HANSARD, the Official Report of debates in Parliament, pertaining to my little whenua #downunder.

Besides Hansard itself; by volume, there are Lords sittings, Commons sittings or Westminster Hall sittings.  Written Answers, Written Statements, Lords reports or Grand Committee reports.

The Information used has been provided by the Hansard Digitisation Project, led by the Directorate of Information Services of the House of Commons and the Library of the House of Lords.

The site is still undergoing development and experimentation, and further features may be added in due course. Work to improve the quality of the data is also ongoing.

The LINK to this site if anyone is interested in researching for themselves is:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 

I shall begin with NEW ZEALAND.

Mr Thomas Spring-Rice

Lords — July 10, 1845

In the administration of New Zealand; and the members of the Committee so far had been amply supported by events which had occurred in the Colony itself. But he entirely protested against the doctrine that the finding

I will enter this and other information as it is posted on the Hansard millbank systems website.

HANSARD 1803–2005 → 1840s → 1845 → July 1845 → 10 July 1845 → Lords Sitting

HL Deb 10 July 1845 vol 82 cc312-9

The Earl of Chichester presented a petition from the Church Missionary Society of Africa and the East, respecting the rights of the natives to the full enjoyment of their lands, and praying that the same may be effectually secured to them. It stated, that there were 35,000 attendants at religious worship, 15,000 scholars, and 300 native teachers. The petitioners stated, that from the period of the cession of the land by the native princes, they did everything to promote harmony between the aborigines and the colonists: that they were deeply impressed with the necessity of having the land question speedily and finally settled. That the Queen, by the Treaty of Waitangi, guaranteed full and undisputed possession of their lands to the natives, and that, in the opinion of the petitioners, the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, affecting the rights of the native princes, was contrary to the principles of justice, and to the express declaration of the Treaty of Waitangi. Their Lordships could understand the alarm felt by the Society, whose petition he had read, as well as the alarm of all those who took an interest in their happiness and welfare. The missionaries of the Society were alarmed at a course of policy being suggested, the pursuance of which would set aside the Treaty of Waitangi, which provided, that natives should not have lands taken away from them by virtue of the sovereignty over the island, ceded by them to the British Crown. Nothing, he thought, could be more clear, than the actual meaning of the Treaty; and he believed that the New Zealanders were sufficiently enlightened and educated, perfectly to understand the interpretation which common sense would put upon it. To act in any way in contravention to the Treaty, would be to pursue a course at once fraught with disaster to the natives and to the settlers in New Zealand. He wished to take the opportunity of making a statement to the House upon the part of the Church Missionary Society, because, among other charges made by the friends of the Company, was one which accused the missionaries in New Zealand of having acted in an improper manner; of having, in fact, impeded the progress of the Colony, and of having obtained—not by the most reputable means—a very large quantity of land. Now, the land in question was held under certain regulations made by the Missionary Society, which allowed a certain sum of money to the missionaries for every child above fifteen years of age; that money had been invested in the purchase of land, obtained, not for the private advantages of the missionaries, but for the public good. The regulations had been strictly acted upon in these purchases, and he possessed authentic information of the exact quantity of land so obtained. The Society had also purchased a certain portion of the land for the purposes of the mission, but the whole of this property had been placed at the disposal of the Crown. No missionary held more land than he was strictly entitled to hold under the regulations of the Society, and there was no instance of a missionary's claim having been disallowed by the Government Commissioner. In the cases in which a reduction had been made in the quantity of land possessed by missionaries, the reduction had been effected with the perfect consent of the holders. He would remind the House of the favourable testimony borne to the conduct of the missionaries of the Church Society, by all who had had an opportunity of witnessing it. New Zealand had been visited by many travellers—some of them in an official capacity; it had been  recently visited by two bishops, and the conduct of the missionaries had also been watched by witnesses not likely to be partial to them—he meant the emissaries of a neighbouring, not a rival institution—the Wesleyan mission—the missionaries of the Church Society had been watched, and their conduct had been commented upon by all those witnesses to it, and he had never heard it asserted that they had been led away from their ministerial duties by any occupation connected with the possession of land. On the contrary, every report which he had seen on the state of New Zealand was most creditable to the missionaries, and proved them to be most worthy and disinterested men. One of the great objects he had in making these remarks was, if possible, to draw from Government some assurance that the alarm felt by the petitioners, from the cause to which he had alluded, was unfounded. He believed that the maintenance of that interpretation hitherto put upon the Treaty of Waitangi was of the greatest importance to our own reputation for good faith, and to the cause of the civilization and progress of New Zealand. So long as the missionaries had been unmolested by voluntary settlers, nothing could have been more satisfactory than the way in which the natives had conducted themselves, and nothing more rapid than the progress they had made in Christian knowledge. He hoped that the Government would feel the great importance of promoting that object, and would recollect that it could only be attained by maintaining the strictest good faith towards the natives themselves—by showing that we were alive to their bet interests, and that we had taken New Zealand under our protection, as much with a view to their benefit as our own.

Lord Stanley Your Lordships will feel that it would be very inconvenient were I at all to enter at this time upon the general question connected with New Zealand. I have no intention of troubling you with a single word upon that subject; but the noble Earl has indicated a desire to hear the views of Her Majesty's Government as to that Treaty by which the sovereignty of New Zealand was ceded to the British Crown. I have no hesitation in giving the noble Earl the assurance which he seems to desire. At the same time, however, I should have thought—whatever may have been the suspicions—whatever may have been the blame cast upon the Government in the matter—that the course which they have pursued would have prevented its being imagined for a moment that they entertained an idea of avoiding, or in any way violating a Treaty by which they consider themselves to be bound. Almost the whole of the difficulty with which the Government has had to contend in New Zealand, has arisen out of the apparently conflicting engagements entered into towards the New Zealand Company on the one hand, and, under the Treaty of Waitangi, towards the natives on the other. Had we felt ourselves at liberty to depart from the strictest fulfilment of the terms of that Treaty, we should have met but little difficulty; and in proof of the fact, our embarrassments have arisen mainly from our feeling that, however desirable and important it is to promote the colonization of New Zealand, yet that object would be very dearly purchased were it to be obtained by the slightest reflection on the good faith of this country, or by any liability to the imputation that we wished to shrink from an engagement we entered into with the natives—an engagement which I think the natives perfectly understand, the full importance of which I think they are as deeply impressed with as we can be—and an engagement which we have always felt that the Government of this country were bound to adhere to in its fullest integrity. I assure your Lordships that we have strictly, in every instruction we have issued (and the Papers upon the Table prove the fact), insisted on the strict fulfilment of the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Waitangi. Our instructions upon that point have been uniform. They were given to Captain Fitzroy, and whatever instructions may have been since despatched to his successor, they have in this respect remained unaltered. We have told him—our declarations to the effect have been reiterated—that while he should seek in every possible mode to promote the amicable settlement of the affairs of the New Zealand Company, that he should always consider it to be the paramount duty devolved upon him, specially, and scrupulously, and religiously to fulfil our solemn engagements with the natives of New Zealand.

Lord Monteagle thought that it would be very satisfactory were the noble Lord to state more definitely what was the precise construction put by the Government upon the Treaty in question. He would wish to know whether he carried the principle so far as to assume that there was to remain to a semi-barbarous population such a right over the whole of the immense territory of New Zealand as would preclude the possibility of our exercising a right of government, except by the permission of the natives themselves. With respect to the general subject, he was far from adopting all the views of the New Zealand Committee. He knew the difficulties which the Colonial Office had to contend with in the cases of Colonies founded by unauthorized settlers. Most of the difficulties of New Zealand had arisen from that cause, and from the character of many of the original settlers in New Zealand, comprehending, as they did, some of the worst portion of the population of Australia and of this country. He repeated that he did not by any means fully adopt the Report of the New Zealand Committee; but still the opinion of that body was entitled to very considerable weight, when it was recollected that it had been appointed with the approval and concurrence of the Colonial Office. He did not want to go beyond the fact that the Report of the Committee had been generally adverse to the system pursued by the Colonial Office in the administration of New Zealand; and the members of the Committee so far had been amply supported by events which had occurred in the Colony itself. But he entirely protested against the doctrine that the finding fault, even by inference, with the management of New Zealand, was to suggest that there had been any bad faith or double dealing on the part of the Colonial Office. Any such charge was as much unsupported by proof as it was contradicted by the character of the noble Lord at the head of that branch of the public service. Still, however, a more melancholy instance of mismanagement than that displayed in the local government of New Zealand, never was exhibited in the colonial administration of any country; and he was convinced that until there should be a clear and distinct exposition, upon the part of Government, of the exact construction which it would be prepared to put upon the Treaty of Waitangi, that the state of confusion which now existed in New Zealand would continue. He wished to guard himself from being supposed to acquiesce in all the statements of the petitioners; but he did believe that had the missionaries been left unmolested by the vicious population which had settled around them, the results of their labours would have been such as had been anticipated by his noble Friend who had presented their petition. But from the evil influence exerted upon New Zealand by its first settlers, a train of calamities arose. Insults had been offered to the British name, crimes had been committed, wars waged to an extent unequalled in the history of our colonial administration. He repeated that the Colonial Office was not to be blamed for this. He had been for a short time in that Office himself; and he could not forget not only the difficulties but the perfect impossibility which, as it seemed to him, existed in many of the duties of that Office, as at present constituted, being satisfactorily performed. In 1834 a change had taken place in the Colonial Office, which it would have been well to have adhered to. Our Colonies had increased in numbers and in importance, to such an extent, that his noble Friend, with all his energy and ability—or, indeed, that two equal to his noble Friend, would be incapable of carrying on the manifold duties of the Colonial Secretary in such a manner as to be generally satisfactory and generally successful, and as it had been comparatively easy to manage them fifty years ago. He expressed his regret that the improvements introduced into the constitution of the Colonial Office, in 1834, had not been adhered to.

The Earl of Chichester never considered that the Government could be fairly charged with any breach of faith in their administration of the affairs of New Zealand, The Church Missionary Society, however, had reasonable grounds for the fears expressed in their petition. He was satisfied with the distinct intimation of his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Department, and he was sure that that intimation would be equally satisfactory to the petitioners.

Lord Stanley I beg to say one word. I should have wished that my noble Friend had either abstained from touching on the topics to which he has alluded, or that he had brought forward the subject in a more distinct form, and at a period of the evening, and in a state of the House, when I could have entered into a full explanation of the different points alluded to. Under present circumstances, then, I will abstain from doing anything but answering the demand made upon me by my noble Friend as to the construction which Government is prepared to place upon the Treaty of Waitangi, The whole question of that Treaty I will not argue now. If my noble Friend will give me an opportunity of arguing it, I will undertake to prove to demonstration, that not only by the present, but by all former Governments—that not only by the noble Lord who preceded me, but by the noble Marquess who preceded him—that not only by the present but by former Parliaments, has the same construction been placed upon the Treaty of Waitangi—that construction which never was disputed by any authority, by any party, until the year 1842. I am prepared also to show, and whenever I am called on I shall show, in this House, that whatever may be the apparent discrepency between the conditions of arrangement entered into by Lord John Russell with the New Zealand Company, and those concluded under the Treaty of Waitangi, that discrepancy is not real, but apparent, and that it arose from Lord John Russell acting on the misrepresentation of facts made to him by the New Zealand Company. He conceded to that Company, on the past of the Crown, a certain number of acres, providing that that number of acres should be taken within a certain district—the foundation of the whole arrangement being the assertion and declaration of the New Zealand Company, that they had purchased the whole of that district, comprising a space of about twenty millions of acres, from the natives themselves. In that way, and in that way alone, can the arrangements of the noble Lord be consistent. In that way they are consistent, and in that way the declaration and agreement made by Lord John Russell, confirming, instead of contradicting, the Treaty of Waitangi—namely, that on the part of the Crown, he confirmed the claim of the Company to a certain tract of land, on the assumption that they had bought it from the natives. In that way I contend the arrangements of the noble Lord are perfectly consistent. His assumption, proved by his agreement, leads to the inference, that, in his opinion, the natives had a right to sell to the Company that tract of land which they did not inhabit; and I can show by repeated Acts of Parliament that that right to sell on the part of the natives, not the land which they occupied and enjoyed, but the waste land which they did not occupy or enjoy, was uniformly recognised during the period from 1836 to 1842. I am not prepared to say that there may not be some districts wholly waste and uncultivated—there are such in the northern island—but they are few in number; but I know that a large portion of the district in question is distributed among various tribes, all of whom have as perfect a knowledge of the boundaries and limits of their possessions—boundaries and limits in some places natural, in others artificial—as satisfactory and well defined, as were, one hundred years ago, the bounds and marshes of districts occupied by great proprietors and their clans in the Highlands of Scotland. With respect to the greater portions of New Zealand, I assert that the limits and rights of tribes are known and decided upon by native law. I am not prepared to say what number of acres in New Zealand are so possessed; but that portion which is not so claimed and possesed by any tribe, is, by the act of sovereignty, vested in the Crown. But that is a question on which native law and custom have to be consulted. That law and that custom are well understood among the natives of the islands. By them we have agreed to be bound, and by them we must abide. These laws — these customs — and the right arising from them on the part of the Crown—we have guaranteed when we accepted the sovereignty of the islands; and be the amount at stake smaller or larger; so far as native title is proved—be the land waste or occupied—barren or enjoyed, those rights and titles the Crown of England is bound in honour to maintain; and the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, with regard to these rights, is, that, except in the case of the intelligent consent of the natives, the Crown has no right to take possession of land, and having no right to take possession of land itself, it has no right—and so long as I am a Minister of the Crown, I shall not advise it to exercise the power—of making over to another party that which it does not itself possess.

Petition read and ordered to lie on the Table.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1845/jul/10/new-zealand#S3V0082P0_18450710_HOL_58  

The more I read of the discussions that took place in the UK Parliament, in the  Lords sittings, and Commons sittings I feel a sense of utter pain for my Maori ancestors and for what they endured at the hands of these marauders, global pirates.

Hei kona.

Water Spouts Blog: China's Yangtze River Runs Mysteriously Red

Water Spouts Blog: China's Yangtze River Runs Mysteriously Red

Wise Words from a Wise Peer

Kiaora. Tena koutou katoa.

Anei nga kupu tuturu o tenei Rangatira ko mate ke inaianei, tana ingoa ko Lloyd Morrison.

He aia he tangata mohio te tapu o ta tatou whenua o Aotearoa.

Greetings to all.

The Late and most Respected Rangatira, Mr Lloyd Morrison has left a legacy for us all to carry on for bettering our well-being and to aid others as well for our sustainable sustenance - To pass on to those born and for those yet to be born.

A very wise man who left us all with some very wise words.

""My work life has been always set up to do something sustainable and extraordinary for everybody involved and that is what I ask of all of you going forward that you push yourselves, that you focus on getting the most out of your lives by giving to other people, that you are intolerant of doing things half baked, you are intolerant of inefficiency and laziness and self-congratulations and complacency as that is unfair on other people, to waste in that way."

I ask my Heavenly Father, why does he always take the Best of the Best so prematurely?

I am still waiting for an answer, and his Only Begotten Son, @Jesus_Christ in Twitter...Needs a kick up the a#!!

Hei kona ra

The case for government reform now

The expanded role of governments means that taxpayers will pay more for public services - and will demand more in return. To meet these expectations, the public sector must transform itself.


Long before governments around the world faced the current economic crisis, they wrestled and still are with many difficult and complex challenges - health care, social security, education, national security, crime and critical infrastructure. The demands on public services were growing along with the burden on taxpayers, and there was no long-term certainty about how to pay the bill. Several countries ran large budget deficits, raising already high levels of public debt.


In recent months, the pressures on governments have multiplied further as a result of a potent cocktail of interlocking emergencies - the financial and economic crises, major shifts in energy prices, climate change, food supplies, and natural resources. The combined effects threatened economic and social breakdown as consumers suffer and unemployment and poverty rise. Even the viability of capitalism has been questioned.


Whatever the public sector's role has been in creating these crises, few doubt that it has a critical role in resolving them. Governments are not only intervening to an unprecedented degree in private markets - with government provisions of a financial safety net for banks and other financial institutions to rescue or reinforce banks, insurance companies, among others - but also accumulating financial covenants that threaten their long-term solvency in the process. Indeed, at a time when they have limited political, social, and financial room for manoeuvre, they are taking on a whole range of tasks beyond the scope of traditional policy and public services.


So now more than ever, governments must discharge their functions proficiently, efficiently and effectively. But few of them have an established track record or reputation for managerial excellence. Indeed, their historical performance of running departments and agencies often arouse scepticism. Many public officials, knowing this, seek to reform the way government works.


These reforms typically fall short: with few exceptions, they skim the surface, cover too little ground, take too long, and leave much of the public sector relatively untouched. That's why there is a need for broader, deeper and faster reforms: what we call whole-government transformation. The current crises provides both the necessity and the chance to improve the machinery of the state fundamentally - a challenge of vast scale and urgency.


Our New Zealand government is just beginning to scratch the surface with their plans to reform our public sector.

Courtesy of John Key Blog Set

There are relatively few instances of governments taking an integrated approach to reform,  but those few illustrate the scale of the opportunity, especially for raising productivity. Under the prime ministership of Göran Persson, for instance, Sweden’s government responded to its mid-1990s budget crisis by shaving 11 percent from operational budgets, with no apparent damage to performance, and then maintained tight control over future spending.

Göran Persson: Sweden’s former prime minister

                                            

Vital statistics

Born January 20, 1949, in Vingåker, Sweden

Education

Studied social science at Örebro University, Sweden

Awarded honorary doctorates in medicine from Örebro University, Sweden (2004); in political science from Dankook University, South Korea (2004); and in political science from Tbilisi State

University, Georgia(2006)

Career highlights

• Prime Minister

(1996–2006)

• Finance Minister

(1994–96)

• Minister of Schools, Ministry of Education

(1989–91)

• Municipal Commissioner of Katrineholm

(1984–89)

• Member of parliament

(1979–84 and 1991–2007)

Fast facts

• Serves as chairman of the board for Sveaskog, Sweden’s largest forest owner

• Is a part time consultant and lecturer

• Runs a small cattle and wood farm in Sörmland County, Sweden

Göran Persson has lived a story that should encourage leaders around the world: how to stay in power while pursuing a harsh crisis programme that requires sacrifices throughout society.

Reforming the public sector in a crisis:

Government leaders around the world face a daunting dual challenge: they must control and, in the long term, slash major budget deficits fuelled by the economic crisis while at the same time

improving the performance of the public sector so that it can meet its complex and ever-rising obligations.

Former Swedish prime minister Göran Persson is no stranger to that challenge. Even his political foes recognize his achievement.

In the early 1990s, Sweden suffered its deepest recession since the Great Depression. Although the Swedish crisis was home-grown, its causes and effects resemble the events unfolding in the world today. After years of strong domestic growth driven by easy credit and high leverage, a real-estate bubble burst, leading to the collapse and partial nationalization of the banking sector. Domestic demand plunged as the household savings ratio soared by 13 percentage points. In

three years, public debt doubled, unemployment tripled, and the government budget deficit increased tenfold, to more than 10 percent of GDP, the largest in any OECD country at the time.

Persson was appointed finance minister when the Social Democrats returned to power, after the 1994 elections, and became prime minister two years later. In order to regain the confidence of

international lenders—and so pave the way for stability and sustainable growth—he knew that Sweden had to reduce its budget deficit dramatically. It took four years for the Swedish government to balance its budget. By 2006, when Persson and his party lost power in the general elections, the country had almost halved its public debt, to just above 40 percent of GDP.

So, what does it take to put troubled state finances in order? and, at the same time, trying  to improve the way the public sector works.

What is the prerequisite for implementing a successful crisis programme?

Göran Persson: The electorate must understand that drastic measures are required. A crisis programme will hurt, and you will need a mandate from the voters if you are to succeed. This makes it difficult for an administration that is in power without such a mandate to take the lead. But it is a fantastic chance for the opposition, provided that there is broad awareness of the gravity of the situation. My party was elected in 1994 because we promised to carry out the harshest programme with the deepest budget cuts and the sharpest tax increases.

Incidentally, today on Q & A, I heard Bill English, I’ve also heard John Key say this as well. That they both believe that they have the Mandate to partially sell-off our assets, as in our Energy Entities (assets) – because in their minds, because their National Party was re-elected and that they had campaigned on their partial sell-off, of our Energy assets to the New Zealand voter, that this gives them the right to go ahead – They only received 47 per cent of the votes, I would hardly call that a Mandate. The New Zealand public who owns these assets were quite explicit in voicing their opposition to these partial sell-offs via various media and social platforms long before the General Election back in November 2011.

Only a referendum (where we Kiwi’s speak with one voice), would give the government the answer and I would wager that the government would not get the go ahead – and they both know it! We are a Democratic country not a Communist country. Why should I purchase shares in an energy company that I am already a shareholder in? The truth is the government want foreign outside interests to buy into our Energy companies and their rhetoric on Mum’s and Dad’s get first option is just that rhetoric. What disposable income Mum’s and Dad’s have if any, has to be prioritised in just living from day to day, or week to week for many Kiwi families – Many have lost or will be losing their employment. Only the select wealthy of New Zealanders’ will be able to purchase shares and no doubt in bulk as well.

I do believe however, that we need to be proficient (highly skilled), firstly, in order to be efficient and to be effective. Proficiency seems to be absent from both John Key and Bill Englishs’ Recipe of Reforms goodness knows there hasn’t been a lot of proficient public sector management especially from within the ‘Treasury’ the “lead advisors” to the government, so sayeth Gabriel Mclouf,  the apparent wise councillors, so sayeth Siena...Not! Ever noticed how many things come in threes?

Like for example, Einstein's Three Rules of Work: 1) Out of clutter find simplicity; 2) From discord find harmony; 3) In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity. 

--Albert Einstein

So 1) Proficiency leads to 2) Efficiency that hopefully should lead to 3) Effectiveness.

Smarty Panties aren’t I?

What advice would you give leaders or incumbent leaders who don’t have a mandate from the voters for instituting radical reform?

Göran Persson: You have to make it absolutely clear that you are putting your office at stake; that you are prepared to call new elections or, if your parliamentary group is not behind you, to resign. The forces working against a harsh crisis programme are very strong—almost every area of the public sector has its own vested interests—so any sign that you might waver in your commitment will doom the programme to fail.

Please summarize the lessons you have learned about leading, designing, and implementing the process for putting state finances in order.

Göran Persson: First, it is extremely important to be in the driver’s seat. You must make it clear that you are responsible for the process and that you are prepared to put your position at stake. Second, the consolidation programme must be designed so that the burdens are shared fairly. Public-sector cuts will hurt the most vulnerable people in society, so those who are better off need to contribute—for example, by paying higher taxes. Public support for tough policies would quickly deteriorate if they were not perceived as fair, and parliament would lose the political will to make hard decisions. Third, the consolidation programme has to be designed as a comprehensive package; if you are in as deep trouble as we were, an ad-hoc hodgepodge of measures will only have a limited chance of success. Moreover, by presenting the measures together, it becomes clear to all interest groups that they are not the only ones being asked to make sacrifices. It also has to be a front-loaded program. By starting with the most difficult measures, you demonstrate your resolve and increase the chances of achieving the early results, which will be important for getting the continued support that is critical for sustaining the effort.

Transparency is the fourth lesson. You must never play down the effects of the programme’s measures. On the contrary, remind the public again and again that this will hurt. It is one thing to get support in parliament for the programme; it’s another to stay in control during the

implementation phase, when the measures become real for ordinary people in their daily lives. You must also be completely honest when you communicate with financial markets. Clarify assumptions and calculations. Don’t use any bookkeeping tricks. Only then can you recover credibility; only then can the programme earn legitimacy. Indeed, you should always go for conservative estimates. If, for instance, you estimate that economic growth will be 1.5 percent and you end up with 2.5 percent, you will have solved much of the credibility problem.

The electorate’s patience is never endless. How much time do you have until it runs out?

Göran Persson: You have two years. If you are not in command of the process by then, you will lose momentum and soon face the next election—where you will be replaced. We survived the 1998 election and were rewarded politically for what we had done by being re-elected once more in 2002, when the good times returned and we were in firm control of the public finances.

Cutting the state budget during a crisis puts pressure on the public sector at a time when its services are perhaps more important than ever. How did you handle this problem?

Göran Persson: Restoring the health of our public finances was the prerequisite for preserving the Swedish public sector in the long term, and this would not have been possible without sacrifices. One-third of our programme consisted of tax increases, and two-thirds of spending cuts, both in the operational budgets of the central and local authorities and in the legislated levels of welfare transfers. We cut pensions, sick-leave compensation, and unemployment benefits, which hurt people who already had only small margins in their household finances. That shouldn’t have been necessary in an ideal world, because lower welfare transfers reduced domestic demand and tax

revenues and thus had a negative impact on growth and employment and a small net effect on the budget. But we had no choice. High interest rates made it necessary to regain the confidence of investors all over the world whose perception was that Sweden’s generous welfare model was to blame for the crisis. In fact, it wasn’t until we cut unemployment benefits and got into open conflict with the trade unions that market interest rates started coming down.

It’s often said that with a crisis comes an opportunity for reform. Did you use this opportunity to improve the long-term performance of the public sector?

Göran Persson: Yes, the cuts in government consumption became a driver of improved efficiency, since public authorities were forced to do the same job on unchanged or reduced budgets.

In addition, we pursued targeted policies with various objectives. One strategy—aiming to improve productivity, service quality, and freedom of choice—involved the liberalization of telecommunications, mail, railways, and other infrastructure industries. It also involved allowing privately run providers to compete with public ones in providing tax-financed services for the school system, health care, child care, and care for the elderly.

Another measure was to introduce information technology to broad layers of the population through a tax-deduction scheme that allowed workers to obtain a home computer under a favourable leasing agreement with their employers. The penetration of IT in Sweden during these years outpaced every other country in the world, which made it possible for authorities like the Tax Agency to go online at an early stage. Indeed, I’m quite confident today that information

technology improves government productivity as well as the delivery of its services. More and more of the communication between Swedish public agencies and citizens now takes place on the Web, and many Swedes do their annual tax submissions over the Internet, allowing for a very efficient processing of taxes. I think our tax agency is one of the most efficient in the world and very much so because we are using modern technologies. We have one of the world’s largest public sectors and, along with the Danes, the world’s highest taxes, claiming almost 50 percent of GDP. We are also very good at collecting these taxes.

A third strategy was to give people with basic schooling the chance to complete a secondary education that would qualify them for university studies. It was a straightforward system: an employed worker would get the equivalent of the unemployment benefit if he or she entered an

adult-education program and if the employer agreed to replace him or her with an unemployed person. The employer’s cost was unchanged, and the state’s cost was limited to the education itself. Believe it or not, more than 10 percent of the workforce seized this opportunity between 1997 and 2002. It was mainly women who did so, and many went on to study at a university. When the business cycle turned up again, they became a very good resource on the labour market, not least in the public sector. This education scheme served a dual purpose:

it eased the pain of unemployment and increased Sweden’s long-term competitiveness by lifting the average competence level of the workforce.

What approach did you take to set efficiency targets and drive savings across the government?

Göran Persson: We introduced three-year ceilings on public expenditure for each ministry. Within this ceiling, we gave the ministries and public agencies some flexibility to distribute their

expenditure levels between the years in each three-year frame as long as they reached their final target. These caps on expenditure were the main driving force. Sweden has a decentralized system of government, so even though we set the guidelines it was up to each authority to figure out how to fulfil its service obligations while still achieving the required spending cuts. The budget cuts for the authorities and agencies amounted to a grand total of 11 percent from 1995 to 1998. After that, we built in an efficiency factor based on productivity in the private-service sector, which the public agencies had to match. By doing so, we continued to put pressure on them to improve their efficiency and produce more or the same for less. The result was that they started to examine expenditures that they had regarded as impossible to influence—for instance the location and rental cost of their offices—and they also became more careful about whom to employ and about developing the staff they already had.

As the political leader, what was your experience with trying to get the civil servants on board and making them partners in the initiative?

Göran Persson: They had never experienced a crisis of this magnitude. Some reacted to it as a professional opportunity to perform a very significant task. Others felt betrayed by the cuts and

that it was not their role to deal with productivity or efficiency issues. In the end, though, it was quite easy to get the civil servants on board because they were all conscious of the crisis and its dangers.

Did you make many personnel changes, particularly in important positions?

Göran Persson: Only gradually and in a small way. It’s very easy to get rid of people, but it’s difficult to find new ones that you can be sure are better. So I find that it’s often wiser to stick with the staff you have. It is, after all, the politicians who are responsible for restoring order in the country’s finances, so it’s up to them to lead, support, educate, and stimulate those who carry it out. Sometimes you are successful in this regard; sometimes you fail.

Country statistical profile: Sweden 2011-2012 (including 2003 – 2010).

Unit

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009*

2010

Production and income

Gross domestic product (GDP) Bln USD curr. PPPs 272.5 292.4 295.3 324.0 352.1 364.0* 345.5 365.9

GDP per capita USD current PPPs 30 418 32 506 32 701 35 680 38 486 39 475* 37 155 39 013

Gross national income (GNI) per capita USD current PPPs 30 793 32 500 32 936 36 139 39 364 40 870* 37 825 39 728

Household disposable income Annual growth % 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.8 5.4 3.2* 1.6 1.4

Economic growth

Real GDP growth Annual growth % 2.3 4.2 3.2 4.3 3.3 -0.6* -5.3 5.7

Net saving rate in household disposable income % 7.2 6.1 5.5 6.6 8.8 11.2* 12.9 10.8

Gross fixed capital formation % of GDP 1.6 5.7 8.1 9.2 8.9 1.4* -16.3 7.1

Economic structure

Real value added: agriculture, forestry, fishing Annual growth % 1.0 8.2 -3.2 11.0 4.9 1.2* 0.6 -0.8

Real value added: industry Annual growth % 3.9 9.7 4.4 4.0 4.3 -5.2* -15.8 15.3

Real value added: services Annual growth % 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0* 1.3 0.8

Government deficits and debt

Government deficit % of GDP -1.3 0.4 1.9 2.2 3.6 2.2* -0.9 -0.3

General government debt % of GDP 59.3 60.0 60.8 53.9 49.3 49.6* 52.0 49.1

General government revenues % of GDP 54.4 54.6 55.8 54.9 54.5 53.9* 54.2 52.7

General government expenditures % of GDP 55.7 54.2 53.9 52.7 51.0 51.7* 55.2 53.1

Expenditure

Public expenditure on health % of GDP 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.5* 8.2 ..

Private expenditure on health % of GDP 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7* 1.9 ..

Public social expenditure % of GDP 30.1 29.5 29.1 28.4 27.3 .. .. ..

Private social expenditure % of GDP 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 .. .. ..

Public pension expenditure % of GDP 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.2 .. .. ..

Private pension expenditure % of GDP .. .. 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2* .. ..

Net official development assistance (Aid) % of GNI 0.79 0.78 0.94 1.02 0.93 0.98* 1.12 0.97

Taxes

Total tax revenue % of GDP 47.8 48.1 48.9 48.3 47.4 46.3* 46.4 ..

Taxes on income and profits % of GDP 17.6 18.3 19.1 19.1 18.4 16.8* 16.3 ..

Taxes on goods and services % of GDP 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.8* 13.5 ..

Taxes on the average worker % of labour cost 48.2 48.4 48.1 47.8 45.3 44.8* 43.2 42.7

Trade

Imports of goods and services % of GDP 36.7 37.8 40.6 43.0 44.4 46.8* 41.9 44.1

Exports of goods and services % of GDP 43.5 46.0 48.4 51.1 51.9 53.5* 48.4 50.0

Goods trade balance: exports minus imports of goods Bln USD 18.2 22.8 18.9 20.3 16.2 16.5* 10.7 9.7

Imports of goods Bln USD 84.2 100.5 111.4 127.1 152.8 167.3* 120.2 148.4

Exports of goods Bln USD 102.4 123.2 130.3 147.4 169.1 183.9* 131.0 158.1

Service trade balance: exports minus imports of services Bln USD 1.7 5.5 7.3 9.7 15.6 16.6* 13.5 15.9

Imports of services Bln USD 28.6 33.0 35.0 39.2 47.3 53.8* 45.7 48.5

Exports of services Bln USD 30.2 38.4 42.4 48.8 62.7 70.2* 58.9 64.2

Current account balance of payments % of GDP 7.0

Foreign direct investment (FDI)

Outward FDI stocks Mln USD .. .. .. .. 332 208 322 952 347 557 336 086

Inward FDI stocks Mln USD .. .. .. .. 293 384 278 710 331 932 348 667

Inflows of foreign direct investment Mln USD .. 22 227 27 712 26 613 38 811 31 298* 26 300 31 841

Outflows of foreign direct investment Mln USD .. 12 125 11 897 28 908 27 740 37 120* 10 673 6 026

Prices and interest rates

Inflation rate: all items Annual growth % 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.4* -0.5 1.2

Inflation rate: all items non food non energy Annual growth % 0.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.5 3.2 1.3* -0.4 -0.4

Inflation rate: food Annual growth % 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 0.8 2.0 6.9* 2.9 1.4

Inflation rate: food Annual growth % 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 0.8 2.0 6.9* 2.9 1.4

Inflation rate: energy Annual growth % 13.4 4.0 4.1 7.8 -1.5 11.8* -1.7 6.8

Producer Price Indices (PPI): manufacturing Annual growth % -0.9 1.8 4.0 3.9 3.3 3.9* 1.0 0.3

Long-term interest rates % 4.64 4.43 3.38 3.70 4.17 3.89* 3.25 2.89

Purchasing power and exchange rates

Purchasing power parities SEK per USD 9.34 9.10 9.38 9.09 8.88 8.80* 8.94 9.04

Exchange rates SEK per USD 8.09 7.35 7.47 7.38 6.76 6.59* 7.65 7.21

Indices of price levels OECD = 100 119 122 124 123 127 126* 115 122

Energy supply and prices

Total primary energy supply (TPES) Mtoe 50.6 52.6 51.6 50.2 50.1 49.6* 45.4 50.8

Total primary energy supply per capita Toe per capita 5.65 5.85 5.71 5.53 5.47 5.38* 4.88 5.41

TPES per unit of GDP at 2000 prices and PPPs Toe per '000 USD 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16* 0.16 0.17

Renewables' contribution to total primary energy supply % 24.5 25.0 28.8 28.7 30.5 31.5* 34.8 32.7

Crude oil import prices USD per barrel 28.60 36.47 51.78 62.50 70.13 95.09* 60.58 79.00

Information and Communications Technology (ICT)

ICT investment in non-residential fixed capital formation % 24.7 24.3 25.1 24.4 23.0 21.9* 24.7 ..

ICT related occupations: total employment % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.5

Households with access to the Internet % .. .. 72.5 .. .. 84.4* 86.0 ..

Environment

Water abstractions Mln m3 .. .. 290 .. .. .. .. ..

Fish landings in domestic and foreign ports '000 tonnes 281 262 239 262 246 219* 197 ..

Aquaculture '000 tonnes 12 7 7 9 6 9* 9 ..

Municipal waste total '000 tonnes .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 490 ..

Municipal waste per capita Kg .. .. 480 .. .. .. 480 ..

CO2emissions from fuel combustion Mln tonnes 55 54 50 48 46 45* 42 ..

Education

Tertiary attainment in population aged 25-64 % .. .. .. .. .. .. 33.0 ..

Expenditure per student: non-tertiary, 2008 prices USD constant PPPs .. .. .. .. .. 9 524.2* .. ..

Expenditure per student: tertiary, 2008 prices USD constant PPPs .. .. .. .. .. 20 013.8* .. ..

Employment

Employment rate in population aged 15-24 % 46.1 44.0 43.3 44.8 46.8 46.4* 38.4 38.5

Employment rate in population aged 25-54 % 83.5 82.9 83.9 84.7 86.1 86.5* 84.4 85.0

Employment rate in population aged 55-64 % 69.0 69.5 69.6 69.8 70.1 70.3* 70.1 70.6

Incidence of part-time employment % 14.1 14.4 13.5 13.4 14.4 14.4* 14.6 14.0

Self-employment rate: total civilian employment % 9.6 9.9

|

9.8 10.0 10.6 10.4* 10.7 10.9

Self-employment rate: total civilian employment % 9.6 9.9

|

9.8 10.0 10.6 10.4* 10.7 10.9

Self-employment rate, men: male civilian employment % 13.9 14.3

|

14.0 14.2 14.9 14.5* 14.7 15.0

Self-employment rate, women: female civilian employment % 5.1 5.2

|

5.3 5.4 5.8 5.9* 6.2 6.4

Unemployment

Unemployment rate: total civilian labour force % 6.6 7.4 7.7

|

7.1 6.1 6.2* 8.3 8.4

Unemployment rate, men: male civilian labour force % 6.9 7.6 7.7

|

6.9 5.9 5.9* 8.6 8.5

Unemployment rate, women: female civilian labour force % 6.2 7.1 7.6

|

7.2 6.4 6.5* 8.0 8.3

Long-term unemployment: total unemployed % 17.8 18.9 .. .. 13.0 12.4* 12.8 16.6

Labour compensation and hours worked

Labour compensation per unit labour input, total economy Annual growth % 4.3 2.4 3.4 2.2 3.9 1.3* 2.3 1.1

Average time worked per person in employment Hours per year 1 582 1 605 1 605 1 599 1 618 1 617* 1 602 1 624

Research and Development (R&D)

Gross domestic expenditure on R&D % of GDP 3.80 3.58 3.56

|

3.68 3.40 3.70* 3.62 ..

Gross domestic expenditure on R&D % of GDP 3.80 3.58 3.56

|

3.68 3.40 3.70* 3.62 ..

Researchers: full-time equivalent Per '000 employed 11.0 11.2 12.7

|

12.6 10.1

|

10.5* 10.5 ..

Population

Total population '000 persons 8 958 8 994 9 030 9 081 9 148 9 220* 9 299 9 379

Population growth rates % 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8* 0.9 0.9

Total fertility rates Children 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9* 1.9 ..

Youth population aged less than 15 % of population 17.9 17.7 17.4 17.1 16.9 16.7* 16.6 16.6

Elderly population aged 65 and over % of population 17.2 17.2 17.3 17.3 17.4 17.6* 17.9 18.3

International migration

Net migration rate Per '000 inhabitants 3.2 2.8 3.0 5.6 5.9 6.1* 6.8 5.3

Foreign-born population % of population 12.0 12.2 12.5 12.9 13.4 13.9* 14.4 ..

Foreign population % of population 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.7 6.0* 6.4 ..

Unemployment rate of native-born men % of labour force .. .. 7.0 .. .. .. 7.5 ..

Unemployment rate of foreign-born men % of labour force .. .. 15.1 .. .. .. 16.2 ..

Unemployment rate of native-born women % of labour force .. .. 6.9 .. .. .. 6.9 ..

Unemployment rate of foreign-born women % of labour force .. .. 13.7 .. .. .. 14.5 ..

Health

Life expectancy at birth Years 80.2 80.5 80.6 80.8 81.0 81.2* 81.4 81.5

Life expectancy at birth: men Years 77.9 78.4 78.4 78.7 78.9 79.1* 79.4

Life expectancy at birth: women Years 82.5 82.7 82.8 82.9 83.0 83.2* 83.4

Infant mortality Per '000 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.5* 2.5

Overweight and obese aged 15 and over % of population 42.8 42.6 44.0 44.4 44.0 45.6* 46.3

Society

Suicide rates Per 100 000 persons .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.0

Youths 20-24 not in education nor employment % 4.2 4.8 4.7 5.3 5.4 4.4* 5.5

Youths 15-19 not in education nor employment % 11.8 13.6 13.4 15.2 13.1 12.9* 16.5

Transport

Goods transport Mln tonne-km 44 289 45 860 48 807 50 349 52 057 53 908* 45 545

Passenger transport Mln passenger-km 114 234 114 558 115 036 115 317 118 361 117 917* 119 116

Road fatalities Per mln inhabitants 59 53 49 49 51 43* 39

Göran Persson serves                                         Göran Persson serves

as finance minister                                              as prime minister

1994 1995 1996: Series of strict budget bills passed. The IT commission is formed in 1994 also and proposition put forward in 1996.

1997: Major labour union offers computer loans to members and the “Knowledge Lift”

adult-education programme is launched.

1998: Tax break on computer leases introduced.

2003: “ Delegation for the 24/7 Agency” established to coordinate online government efforts.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007: 

• Deregulation of state monopolies

• Rapid increase in establishment of charter schools

• Devolution of financial resources to regional and local authorities

Courtesy of Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); McKinsey analysis

Did you set up some kind of machinery at the centre of government to monitor departments and agencies and to intervene, when necessary, to move things along?

Göran Persson: No, we did not. We were in such acute crisis that we had to move as quickly as we could, so we executed the programme without reflecting in detail on its implementation. We monitored two indicators very closely; one was the bottom line of the state finances and the other Sweden’s interest rate levels, because financial markets reacted very quickly to the program and its progress. If I had to do it all again, I would perhaps set up some centralized unit just to monitor

progress and to spread ideas and best practices.

Did the process lead to significant changes in the way government worked and the way it developed and delivered its services?

Göran Persson: The efficiency targets had positive consequences for public services, at both the state and local levels. At the local level, the targets encouraged public agencies to collaborate, leading to better services for the people. Similarly, as a response to the remit we gave

government agencies—such as the tax and social-security authorities— to improve their efficiency to private-sector levels, they started talking to each other and cooperating more closely than before. We didn’t plan these changes, but they were positive nevertheless.

The cabinet was another example of change. People tend to view it as a tight-knit team, but it is

not. Ministers are constantly competing with each other for the available resources. This was

not the case during the crisis. In fact, it was the only time in my 15 years as a cabinet member

when I felt that I was leading a real team where everybody was prepared to contribute and to help each other. Why? Because we all understood that the budget deficit, if left unchecked, could destroy the public sector as we knew it. We also knew that beating the crisis required us to work as a team, because if just one minister leaks to the media that his or her area of responsibility is carrying an unfair share of the burden, the whole process will soon break down. You must realize that the cabinet is one thing; the parliament, however, is something else, and you can never take the support of your parliamentary group for granted. If there is the slightest dissension between your ministers, their support groups in parliament could block bills that you are bringing to the assembly. This would be very serious. A budget-consolidation process of this kind requires not only a state budget: the budget needs to be followed by perhaps 50 or 100 different initiatives that all have to pass through parliament. So if you cannot keep your team together, you will find yourself on a very slippery slope.

What levers did you have at the centre for influencing change at ministries that were not making good on their efficiency targets?

Göran Persson: Each ministry had its own bottom-line target, and if it didn’t make good on that target there would be a discussion with the ministries’ top managers. Where needed, I or my finance minister became directly involved in discussions with departmental ministers. In doing so, we suggested ways to move forward, but we would never tell them what to do. Giving direct and detailed orders would have broken the internal ethics of the budget-consolidation process—which

we had agreed to achieve as a team. It would also have given the finance minister or prime minister ownership of somebody else’s task.

In fact, what is taught in the private sector about the importance of building well-functioning top teams applies to government as well, except that it’s harder in government. Much more transparency is required, and every little detail can become public knowledge. Moreover, your ownership of the process is under constant threat from the opposition and, perhaps, your own parliamentary group. This makes it essential to build loyalty and solidarity within your team

of ministers or else you won’t achieve anything. Political leadership is often said to be about visions and ideas. But it is also about ensuring that a transparent public organization can achieve productive results in its daily work not only once but again and again every year, and under constant external pressure.

I shall conclude with  quotes from Winston Churchill whom makes me laugh...for a bit of fun!

A young man after seeing Churchill leave the bathroom without washing his hands: 

“At Eton they taught us to wash our hands after using the toilet.” 

Churchill: “At Harrow they taught us not to piss on our hands.”

“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.”

Lady Nancy Astor: “Winston if you were my husband, I’d poison your tea.”

Churchill: “Nancy, if I were your husband, I’d drink it.”

Churchill: “Don’t talk to me about naval tradition. It’s nothing but rum, sodomy and the lash.”

Churchill: “I only believe in statistics that I doctored myself.”

What an absolute darling of a man – Direct and to the Point.

I do hope that I will pass my examinations in Law and Public Policy...So far, so good.

GO UNITED! xx  for Sir Alex XX